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Abstract 
With air transportation growing and current civil 
aeronautical communication systems reaching their 
capacity limit in high density areas, the need for new 
aeronautical communication technologies becomes 
apparent. This implies the transition from analogue 
voice to digital data communication. A promising 
candidate for terrestrial air-ground communication is 
the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications 
System (LDACS). LDACS is currently in the process 
of being standardized in ICAO. Being integrated in 
the aeronautical telecommunication network and 
providing a digital communication link for safety 
critical applications, each and every installation of 
LDACS requires protection against cyber-attacks. A 
rigorous threat and risk analysis is the fundamental 
basis to derive an IT security architecture for 
LDACS. The objective of this paper is to identify 
safety relevant air traffic management services, 
perform a threat and risk analysis, and define attacker 
types. Having created a threat catalog, we introduce a 
threat rating system allowing us to set our findings in 
a qualitative context and pave the way for a future 
LDACS IT security architecture. 
Introduction 
Developing new means of communication for 
future aeronautical communications is one of the 
major tasks for civil aviation in the years to come 
[1].The necessity for new aeronautical 
communications becomes apparent when having a 
look at estimates of the increase in number of flights 
worldwide, stating that there will be a growth of 50% 
more flight movements in 2035 compared to 2012 
[1]. Thus the current Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
system, in particular in Europe and the US, will reach 
its current capacity limit [2]. Analogue systems have 
therefore to be replaced by digital means and the 
entire aeronautical communications of tomorrow will 
likely be running on an IP-based architecture [3]. The 
L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications 
System (LDACS) is a candidate for future air-to-
ground communications that has been developed in 
cooperation between the German Aerospace Center 
(DLR) [2], Frequentis AG [4], and the University of 
Salzburg in Austria [5, 6]. With the change from 
analogue to digital wireless communications, 
LDACS requires a thorough IT security analysis in 
order to protect the system properly against threats 
from the IT sector [7]. Project ICONAV1 was a first 
attempt to perform this analysis and to develop a 
''base line protection'' security architecture for 
LDACS that was not yet comprehensive [8]. 
However, a comprehensive and well-designed 
security concept for LDACS is key to its deployment 
and success. 
The main contribution of this paper is an extensive 
threat and risk analysis of LDACS and the 
introduction of a threat rating system allowing us to 
set our findings in a qualitative context. Based on that 
outcome, we can define IT security objectives and 
functions, allowing us to lay the foundation for future 
security mechanisms to protect LDACS against 
adversaries. 
Background 
At the eleventh ICAO air navigation conference 
in 2003, the necessity for evolution of the 
aeronautical air-ground communication became 
apparent [9]. The transition to a future air-ground 
communication infrastructure was identified as a 
prerequisite to provide the capacity required to 
handle future air traffic management data traffic. 
To identify relevant features and to evaluate 
whether an already existing system can meet the 
requirements for the future communications 
infrastructure the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and EUROCONTROL started a joint study 
called Action Plan 17 (AP17). The outcome was that 
no single technology can fulfil all demands 
[10].AP17 sparked therefore the development of new 
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systems based on the identified necessities and 
desired features. For the en-route domain LDACS is 
the designated system, with its origins in merging 
parts of the B-VHF [11], B-AMC [12, 13, 14], TIA-
902 (P34), and WiMAX IEEE 802.16e technologies 
[15]. 
Threat and Risk Analysis 
Methodology 
The approach used in this paper is based on 
established standards. Guidelines for threat and risk 
analysis of IT security flaws and errors in technical 
systems are published in ISO norm 27001, IEC norm 
62443, and the Common Criteria for Information 
Technology Security Evaluations (CCfITSE) [16, 17, 
18]. We chose these norms, and especially the 
Common Criteria (CC) process as they are designed 
to be “useful as a guide for the development, 
evaluation and/or procurement of IT products with 
security functionality“ [16]. However, we do not 
follow the entire CC process yet as LDACS is still in 
development and changes are still being made in the 
standard [6]. This approach still suffices to provide 
orientation in the design process of IT security 
measures. 
In additions to the available standards, several 
works provide guidelines, case studies, and 
preliminary work on LDACS. Mahmoud et al. [19] 
provide a full example on how to conduct a threat 
and risk analysis on a technical system based on a 
quantitative approach making the results measurable 
and not dependent on the expertise of single IT 
security authorities in the field. With AeroMACS 
having its origin in WiMAX, its security features are 
similar and are described in [20]. Tamasi et al. [21] 
provide real life examples and analysis chains on 
how to rate findings. This was later continued by 
Schäfer et al. [22] who provide more recent 
examples. Bilzhause et al. [8] analyzed possible 
implementation options of IT security in LDACS. 
Assets 
Based on the analysis of security objectives in the 
field of communications system in civil aviation [20, 
23] we had a closer look on the procedure followed 
in identifying assets and security objectives in 
LDACS. The term asset is hereby defined as an entity 
that the owner of a system places value upon [10]. 
We start by looking at the three most important 
business goals for information security of the Future 
Communications Infrastructure (FCI) according to 
COCR [23]: 
 
Safety: The FCI must sufficiently mitigate 
attacks, which contributes to safety hazards.  
Regularity of flight: The FCI must sufficiently 
mitigate attacks, which contribute to delays, 
diversions, or cancellations to flights.  
Protection of business interests: The FCI must 
sufficiently mitigate attacks which result in financial 
loss, reputation damage, disclosure of sensitive 
proprietary information, or disclosure of personal 
information.  
Projecting these goals on the LDACS subsystem 
leads to the following categorization: 
Asset – Hardware: The LDACS hardware 
applied in communication/navigation systems, 
responsible for the execution of LDACS relevant 
software, enabling the functionality of LDACS and 
where LDACS relevant information is stored on.  
Asset – Software: The software applied in 
LDACS communication/navigation and also the 
intellectual and physical ownership of that software.  
Asset – Link: All required data links and radio 
communications connections enabling LDACS to 
transmit and receive data via that link.  
Asset – Data: We list all required data relevant 
for an error-free execution of the LDACS 
communications system as follows:   
1. Identity of entities participating in the 
communication 
2. The actually transmitted or received 
communication data  
3. Confidential data, only accessible for 
authorized legitimate entities (this is 
nonexclusive with other items of the list) 
4. Cryptographic keys used for encryption, 
decryption, integrity protection and 
authentication  
5. Configuration data to control, configure 
or alter the functionality and behavior of 
LDACS  
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6. Navigation data including cell location 
and synchronization like the synchronous 
time in the ground stations  
Safety Relevant Services 
When investigating the possible services 
supported by LDACS, it is important to note that in 
general there are five different types of services [3, 
17, 20]: (1) Voice over Very High Frequency (VHF) 
is the basic dialogue mode when performing air 
traffic control operations. (2) Air Traffic Services 
(ATS) serve flight management and include 
communication related to the safety and regularity of 
the flight. It is used for air-to-ground or air-to-air 
communication. (3) Aeronautical Operational Control 
(AOC) is mainly dedicated to flight operation and 
maintenance. (4) Aeronautical Administrative 
Communications (AAC) serve business operations of 
the airline like cabin-management and in-flight 
passenger service. (5) Aeronautical Passengers 
Communications (APC) are dedicated to passenger 
communications inside the cabin.  
Additionally the Network Management (NM), 
even though not mentioned as an explicit separate 
service, is important to be able to transmit any data at 
all. Thus, there are six different basic services. In this 
work we will focus on the data link of the 
communications technology LDACS which aims to 
meet safety and regularity of flight communications 
requirements, in particular those supporting air traffic 
services and safety related aeronautical operational 
control communications. To provide these services, a 
stable and secure network connection is required, 
thus leaving us with three basic IT security relevant 
services for our threat and risk analysis: Air traffic 
services, aeronautical operational control and 
network management services.  
Air Traffic Services 
In total we identified 31 air traffic services 
relevant for LDACS. However, as not all of these 
services prove safety relevant, we restrict our 
analysis to those that are. Aligned with analysis from 
NASA [24, 25] we identified a list of 14 safety 
related ATS services, which LDACS will support.  
ATC (Air Traffic Control) Clearances – ACL: 
As the ACL exists for clearances for an aircraft’s 
physical location, the danger of wrong positioning or 
the wrong sector association of an aircraft endangers 
the physical integrity of the plane.  
Common Trajectory Coordination – COTRAC: 
Used for establishing and coordinating trajectory 
agreements in real-time using the Flight Management 
System (FMS), bad positioning in latitude, longitude, 
altitude, and airspeed is again a danger to the planes 
physical integrity.  
Data Link ATIS (Automatic Terminal 
Information Service) - D-ATIS: D-ATIS provides 
automatic assistance in requesting and delivering air 
traffic information such as meteorological conditions. 
With a forgery of this information, non-optimal or 
dangerous flight routes could be chosen by the FMS.  
Data Link Logon – DLL: The most important 
task of the DLL is to uniquely identify an aircraft, 
thus forgery of these information can lead to disarray 
in the communication and air traffic management 
system.  
Data link Operational En Route Information 
Service - D-ORIS: Data for the to be over-flown area 
is fetched from the D-ORIS service. With missing or 
forged information the flight routine is endangered.  
Data Link Operational Terminal Information 
Service - D-OTIS: Flight information in the 
departure, approach or landing phase is provided by 
D-OTIS. As these are rated as the most critical 
phases of a flight, wrong or missing information can 
prove fatal for passengers, the airport or the planes 
physical integrity.  
Data Link Runway Visual Range - D-RVR: 
When the actual viewing or weather conditions are 
very poor at an airport, another one might be picked 
for landing. Disabling the D-RVR or forging 
information can put a plane in a dangerous situation 
when the actual conditions do not meet the 
transmitted ones.  
Downstream Clearance – DSC: As with 
different phases of the flight, different air traffic 
service units are responsible for that flight and for a 
transition from one to the other a clearance is 
required via the DSC. Disabling the DSC would 
consequently lead to a disruption in the 
communication.  
Data link surface information guidance - D-SIG: 
False information such as the positioning of other 
planes or entities of an airport threatens the physical 
integrity of the aircraft and ground based units.  
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Data Link Significant Meteorological 
Information - D-SIGMET: D-SIGMET informs about 
weather phenomena that may endanger the safety of 
aircraft operations. Disabling it or inserting falsified 
information endangers the flight routine and the 
planes physical integrity.  
Flight Plan Consistency – FLIPCY: This service 
is for detecting inconsistencies between the ATC 
flight plan and the flight plan activated in the plane’s 
FMS. Without this service, inconsistencies may not 
be noted and addressed.  
Flight Path Intent – FLIPINT: As the name of 
the service indicates, the chosen trajectory of a plane 
is synchronized with the responsible air traffic 
management unit, ensuring the consensus about 
routes on ground and airborne.  
Paired Approach ACL - PAIRAPP ACL: When 
several aircraft are approaching the same sector, the 
surveillance and flight intent of all relevant aircraft 
are exchanged and clearances given by the PAIRAPP 
ACL preventing in-air close fly-bys or collisions.  
Wake Broadcast – WAKE: WAKE keeps planes 
at a defined minimal distance and works as a safety 
backup. Disabling it would be one step when trying 
to manipulate aircraft to collide with each other.  
Airline Operational Communications 
Continuing with the AOC services, there are a 
total of 21 services relevant for LDACS, whereas 
only four have been identified to be safety relevant, 
again aligned with [23, 24, 25]. To start sending 
messages and conducting the flight, an indication to 
the AOC is required, stating that the flight crew has 
arrived on board. This is done by the AOC Data Link 
Logon (AOCDLL). The flight plan has to be prepared 
in accordance with AOC and loaded into avionics, 
which is done by the FLTPLAN service. Planned 
load sheet and cargo documentation is provided by 
the LOADSHT service. In case information is forged 
or missing, a disparately loaded aircraft can be the 
consequence of this, rendering it unable to take-off or 
maintain its center of gravity. The Notice to Airmen 
(NOTAM) service alerts the flight crew of special 
events such as military exercises with resulting 
airspace restrictions. Disabling this can lead to the 
intrusion of restricted areas and render the planes 
unable to react to unexpected events. 
Network Management Services 
Concluding with the network management 
services, there is the NETCONN which is established 
between each pair of aircraft and ground systems 
before ATS or AOC data can be exchanged. It is 
normally maintained for the entire length of the flight 
and is vitally important for transferring data, as 
without the data link no communication can take 
place. The second service is the NETKEEP, which 
starts once a connection is established by exchanging 
network keep-alive messages between the aircraft 
and ground systems when there is no communication 
for a period of time, to maintain the status of the 
connection. Again, this service plays an important 
role as by altering or disabling NETKEEP, 
established connections can break down and 
communication is interrupted. 
Summarizing this section, there are a total of 14 
ATS, four AOC and two NM services which are 
safety relevant when running on an underlying 
LDACS system. 
Threat Catalogue 
We analyzed how the LDACS subsystem and 
the identified safety relevant services might be 
threatened. We started by having an overall look on 
protection goals of IT security, used in the Common 
Criteria evaluation process [17]. We define 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity 
and non-repudiation as in [24, 25, 26].  
Confidentiality: The property that information is 
not made available or disclosed to unauthorized 
individuals, entities, or processes.  
System Integrity: Assurance that an information 
system is operating without unauthorized 
modification, alteration, impairment, or destruction 
of any of its components.  
Data Integrity: The property that data has not 
been altered or destroyed without being authorized to 
do so.  
Availability: Assurance that information and 
communications services will be ready for use when 
expected.  
Authenticity: Property that ensures that the 
identity of a subject or resource is the one claimed by 
it.  
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Non-Repudiation: Ability to prove the 
occurrence of a claimed event or action and link it 
evidently to its originating entity.  
Analyzing these security goals in the context of 
LDACS, we identified and selected eight threats 
displayed in Table 1 in alignment with [16, 24]: 
Table 1. Selection of Security Threats to LDACS 
Category Subcategory 
Disclosure of 
Information 
(T1) Scanning the Network 
(T2) Eavesdropping 
(T3) Man in the Middle attack 
Denial of 
Service 
(T4) Flooding 
(T5) Injecting 
(T6) Interfering 
Unauthorized 
entry to system 
(T7) Altering messages 
(T8) Impersonation of other partici-  
      pants of communication 
 
Threat Rating System 
Now we measure the severity and likelihood of 
each threat based on the current LDACS specification 
[4]. To introduce a methodology to rate threats, we 
decided on a severity versus likelihood matrix to 
measure the impact and the probability of a threat to 
actually happen. For that reason we needed to define 
the properties of likelihood and severity. 
Likelihood 
From [7] we adopted the concept that likelihood 
of an actual attack consists of motivation of the 
attacker and technical difficulty to perform the attack. 
Thus, the following holds true: The higher the 
motivation and the lower the difficulty, the higher the 
possibility of an attack. The opposite also holds. The 
fundamental problem with this way of defining 
likelihood is the different existing view points and 
measurement methods: 
• Quantitative - based on measurable 
numbers 
• Qualitative - based on properties and 
expert judgement how likely an attack is to 
be conducted 
For a quantitative measurement, COCR together 
with [27] provided numbers of occurrences of 
incidents within a defined time span in the National 
Airspace System (NAS) (Table 2). However, there 
are no publicly available numbers of incidents in the 
Air Traffic Network (ATN) per operational hour, 
thus we required another method. 
Table 2. Quantitative Measurement of Likelihood 
of Attacks from the IT Sector on the NAS of the 
United States of America 
Likelihood Class Amount of Occurrences in the NAS 
1 - Extremely 
Improbable 
Probability of Occurrence per 
operation/operational hour: <10−9 
2 - Very Remote Probability of Occurrence per 
operation/operational hour: <10−7 and >10−9 
3 - Remote Probability of Occurrence per 
operation/operational hour: <10−5 and >10−7 
4 - Probable Probability of Occurrence per 
operation/operational hour: <10−3 and >10−5 
5 - Very Likely Probability of Occurrence per 
operation/operational hour: >10−3 
 
Regarding qualitative measurement methods, 
there are many examples in literature [28, 29] on how 
to do it .We decided to mix approaches, develop a 
new and more fine-grained rating system and apply 
that onto our threat catalogue. For that purpose we 
defined seven factors all connected to either 
motivation or technical difficulty and rate them from 
zero to five (Table 3), average the score and receive a 
likelihood rating for a certain attack. The final rating 
is based on the following five categories: (1) 
Extremely Improbable with an average score between 
4 and 5, (2) Very Remote with an average score 
between 3 and 4, (3) Remote with an average score 
between 2 and 3, (4) Probable with an average score 
between 1 and 2 and (5) Very Likely with an average 
score between 0 and 1. 
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Table 3. Qualitative Measurement of Likelihood 
of Attacks from the IT Sector on the NAS 
Factor Level Value 
Elapsed 
Time 
<= 1 day 0 
<= 1 week 1 
<= 1 month 2 
<= 3 months 3 
<= 6 months 4 
> 6 months 5 
   
Expertise Computer agnostic 0 
Script Kiddie 1 
Layman 2 
Proficient 3 
Expert 4 
Multiple Experts 5 
   
Knowledge 
of System 
Open 0 
Public 1 
Restricted 2 
Sensitive 3 
Confidential 4 
Critical 5 
   
Window of 
Opportunity 
Unlimited 0 
Very Easy 1 
Easy 2 
Moderate 3 
Difficult 4 
Very Difficult 5 
   
Equipment Directly available 0 
Standard 1 
Sophisticated 2 
Specialized 3 
Bespoke 4 
Multiple bespoke 5 
   
Distributed Attack None 
Weakly distributed 
Minorily distributed 
Distributed 
Highly distributed 
Very highly distributed 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
   
Location dependent No - no safeguards 
No - some safeguards 
No - safeguards 
No - heavy safeguards 
Yes - not protected 
Yes – protected 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
However, the rating of a certain aspect happens 
based on expert judgement and is difficult to quantify 
objectively. 
Severity  
Severity is the property to rate the impact of an 
attack. Aligned with work done in [23, 24], we 
introduce the following aspects to quantify severity. 
The rating itself is done by giving each aspect a score 
and taking the maximum value according to Table 4 
as a rating number for the respective threat. 
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Table 4. Properties for Severity Rating 
Severity 
class 
Description Properties 
  Availability of 
flight routine 
Air Traffic 
Control 
Cost Fatalities “Flying Public” Exposure of proprietary 
information 
1 – 
None 
There is no 
perceivable 
impact on 
safety, flight 
regularity, or 
business 
interests. 
No impact Slight increase 
in ATC 
workload 
0$ 0 No effect on flight 
crew, Has no 
safety effect, 
Inconvenience 
No impact 
2 –  
Minor 
There is a 
limited adverse 
effect on safety, 
flight regularity, 
or business 
interests. 
Recoverable 
loss of 
redundancy or 
backup 
capability 
Slight 
reduction in 
ATC 
capability or 
significant 
increase in 
ATC workload 
0 - 
10.000$ 
0 Slight increase in 
workload, Slight 
reduction in safety 
margin or 
functional 
capabilities, 
Minor illness or 
damage, Some 
physical 
discomfort 
Disclosure of non-
sensitive airline 
operation information 
3 –  
Major 
There is a 
serious adverse 
effect on safety, 
flight regularity, 
or business 
interests. 
Significant 
flight delays 
Reduction in 
separation or 
significant 
reduction in 
ATC 
capability 
10.000 - 
1.000.000$ 
0 Significant 
increase in flight 
crew workload, 
Significant 
reduction in safety 
margin or 
functional 
capability, Major 
illness, injury, or 
damage, Physical 
distress 
Disclosure of some 
sensitive airline 
operation information 
4 –  
Hazardou
s 
There is a 
severe adverse 
effect on safety, 
flight regularity, 
or business 
interests. 
Flight 
interruption 
Reduction in 
separation or a 
total loss of 
ATC 
capability 
(ATC Zero) 
1.000.000 - 
10.000.000$ 
1-5 Large reduction in 
safety margin or 
Functional 
capability, Serious 
or fatal injury to 
small number, 
Physical distress 
or excessive 
workload 
Disclosure of lots of 
sensitive airline 
operation information, 
some security 
information 
5 –  
Catastrop
hic 
There is a 
catastrophic 
effect on safety, 
flight regularity, 
or business 
interests. 
Fleet reroute Collision with 
other aircraft, 
obstacles, or 
terrain 
>10.000.000$ > 5 Hull loss, Multiple 
fatalities 
Disclosure of highly 
sensitive airline 
operation information, 
security information 
Table 5. Applying the Rating System Onto Selected Threats 
Severity/Likelihood 1 - None 2 - Minor 3 – Major 4 - Hazardous 5 - Catastrophic 
1 – Very Likely      
2 – Probable   Threat 1 Threat 4  
3 – Remote    Threats 2,3,7,8  
4 – Very Remote    Threats 5,6  
5 – Extremely Improbable      
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Result 
Now we can form the likelihood/severity matrix 
and introduce three levels of acceptance, again 
aligned with official norms [16].  
Negligible – Green: The threat is known and 
accepted, but deemed harmless.  
Medium – Yellow: No immediate actions must 
be done to hinder the occurrence of the threat, but the 
threat itself and its development will be looked at 
closely.  
Dangerous – Red: The impact of a successful 
attack is not acceptable and thus direct counter 
measures must be introduced.  
The entire rating process of all threats includes 
rating of all attributes of severity and likelihood and 
is thus a long process. In Table 5 we present the final 
outcome, whereas Table 6 and 7 include an overview 
of all ratings regarding severity and likelihood of all 
threats.  
Table 6. Threat Severity Rating 
Properties Threats 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 
Availability 
of flight 
routine 
1 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 
Air Traffic 
Control 
2 1 3 4 4 4 4 3 
Cost 1 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 
Fatalities 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 
“Flying 
Public” 
1 1 2 3 3 3 2 2 
Exposure 
of 
proprietary 
information 
3 4 4 1 3 1 4 4 
Maximum 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Table 7. Threat Likelihood Rating 
Factor Threats 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 
Elapsed 
Time 
1 3 4 2 4 3 3 3 
Expertise 2 3 3 2 4 4 4 3 
Knowledge 
of System 
2 3 3 2 3 4 3 3 
Window of 
Opportunity 
1 3 3 1 3 2 2 2 
Equipment 1 2 2 1 3 4 2 2 
Distributed 
Attack 
2 4 3 2 3 3 2 1 
Location 
dependent 
1 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 
Average 1.4 2.9 3.0 1.7 3.3 3.4 2.7 2.4 
Rating 2 3 3 2 4 4 3 3 
 
Discussion 
As the scope of this paper is limited to the radio 
link in the LDACS subsystem, we will not introduce 
hardware protection mechanisms such as regular 
quality checks, access limitations to special hardware 
and control of personal working on that hardware but 
rather focus on protection of software, the radio link 
and transmitted data. For these classes we derived the 
following five objectives also identified in [8]:  
• The operation of the LDACS system 
security functions shall not diminish the 
ability of the LDACS system to operate 
safely and effectively.  
• The LDACS system shall support 
reliability and robustness to mitigate denial 
of service attacks.  
• The LDACS system shall support message 
authentication and integrity to prevent 
message alteration attacks.  
• The LDACS system should support 
encryption to mitigate eavesdropping.  
• The LDACS system shall support entity 
authentication to mitigate impersonation 
attacks. 
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From the objectives we can now derive some 
ideas on security functions, aligned to the common 
criteria process, that are to be included in our 
LDACS IT security architecture. 
Identification: We have to provide all 
participating entities of our system with a method 
ensuring that the subject is the entity it claims to be. 
Authentication: Authenticity of communication 
partners as well as for user identification and 
authentication defines ways to prove the subjects 
identity.  
Authorization: We have to provide methods in 
our IT security architecture to control the permissions 
granted to entities. 
Encryption: Encryption will be mainly deployed 
for inter-entity user data confidentiality transfer 
protection, making use of cryptographic operations 
either using an asymmetric or symmetric encryption 
approach.  
System Integrity: Integrity here refers to the 
correct and intended functioning of systems. We need 
to implement mechanisms to ensure that. 
Data Integrity: This is related to mechanism for 
data authentication, inter-entity user data integrity 
protection during transmission, and replay detection 
by making use of cryptographic primitives.  
Safety: Safety measurements include self-tests, 
functions for information flow control e.g. according 
to previously specified information flow control 
policies and approaches for general availability 
protection.  
Robustness: Starting in the physical layer, 
protection against physical tampering and 
interference is key in achieving a reliable and robust 
system.  
Secure Logging: Recording the occurrence of 
security relevant events, storing log data securely 
with non-repudiation and immutable properties and 
auditing via security review with data and tools only 
available to authorized users, helps to provide 
assurances that the defined policies and mechanisms 
work as intended.  
Key Management: Secure cryptographic key 
management meaning key generation, key 
distribution, key access and key destruction as well as 
making use of the keys in cryptographic operations 
like encryption, decryption, generation or check of a 
cryptographic checksum for integrity, key agreement 
and so forth is an essential requirement for the 
success of most security functions.  
How these functions are implemented is subject 
to future research. 
Conclusion 
As a promising candidate for the future 
communication infrastructure, LDACS was 
developed since 2007 and is currently in the process 
of being standardized.  
In this paper we present a LDACS threat-and-
risk analysis by introducing a suitable rating 
mechanism. By this we establish principles for a 
complete IT security architecture for LDACS. In the 
threat-and-risk analysis we found eight major threats 
and rated them according to our rating system. Seven 
out of these eight were classified as hazardous, one 
even with a probable likelihood. Based on that 
knowledge, we derived five objectives as protection 
goals for our assets and pointed towards 
corresponding security functions, which can help to 
achieve these goals. 
The results are a promising basis to pave the way for 
a successful IT security architecture includable in the 
standardization process of LDACS. The next steps on 
the road ahead are to further define the security 
functions and to look for suitable places in the 
LDACS protocol stack to implement, test and 
evaluate them. We are convinced that with our 
contributions LDACS will have a better chance at 
being deployed worldwide as the standard for civil 
aeronautical communications in the continental areas 
for the next years to come. 
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